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Abstract
We study equilibria in traffic networks and in power system networks with storage
in the presence of logic constraints. These constraints consist of binary variables that
are added to complementarity-based equilibrium models. Although these models have
been thoroughly studied, the addition of logic constraints can provide additional ben-
efits for practical applications. The main contribution of this work is to demonstrate,
using two specific examples of applications, that logic constraints can render classical
equilibrium models more realistic by allowing the inclusion of useful features such as
equity in network flows or threshold events. Specifically, for the traffic equilibrium
problem, we show how logic constraints can introduce some equity in the assignment
of traffic when more than one equilibrium exists. For power system networks, we show
that the presence of a storage operator acting as a service provider will not only sup-
port the operation of a power grid, but will also help stabilize the price of electricity
and avoid the well-documented price-shifting effect. Unlike previous works, our model
considers the storage operator as a service provider rather than a competitor to the pro-
ducers. We also consider the minimum power output of production. We present results
illustrating the expanded capabilities and insights provided by these new paradigms.
Keywords: Mixed linear complementarity problems, mixed integer linear optimiza-
tion, traffic equilibrium, energy storage, power markets.
1 Introduction
Complementarity problems have become an important tool for modeling equilibria. In
energy markets for example, they can be used to compute the production level of each Nash-
Cournot producer and the price of energy in order to satisfy demand. Complementarity
problems have also been used to model the flow pattern in a traffic network given a set of
travel demands between the origin-destination pairs. Other applications of complementarity
problems can be found in the literature of game theory and market equilibrium in economics,
see for example (Gabriel et al. 2012).
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The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that logic constraints can render classical
equilibrium models more realistic by allowing the inclusion of useful features such as equity
in network flows or threshold events. We do this by considering two specific applications
of equilibria. For the traffic equilibrium problem, we show that logic constraints can be
used to introduce some equity in the assignment of traffic when more than one equilibrium
exists. Logic constraints also make it possible to model threshold effects jointly with the
equilibrium conditions. As a second application, we show that in a power system network,
the presence of a storage operator in the market operating as a service provider will not
only support the generation, transmission, and distribution functions of a power grid, but
will also help stabilize the price of electricity and avoid the price-shifting effect that is well
documented in the literature (Sioshansi et al. 2009).
One of the equilibrium problems studied in this paper is the traffic equilibrium problem
(TEP). This is a classical problem in complementarity modeling which consists of predicting
steady state flows of vehicles along a congested road. Considering a set of origins, a set of
destinations and intermediate nodes, which can relate to intersection points that form a road
network, the objective is to predict how many vehicles will be using the individual paths in
the network if the ‘cost’ of each particular path is taken into account in the decision process
of each vehicle. It is generally agreed that drivers consider a number of criteria (such as
time, money, distance, safety, route complexity, etc.) when selecting paths for their journeys.
Presumably, these criteria are then combined in some manner to define a cost (more generally
a disutility) for each particular path. Wardrop (Wardrop 1952) stated an equilibrium where
no driver had an incentive to deviate from a particular chosen path resulting in the following
two conditions: (a) All paths serving the same origin-destination pair with positive flow
must have the same costs, (b) paths with costs higher than the minimum must have zero
flow. These equilibrium conditions can be formulated as a complementarity problem (see
(Wardrop 1952, Aashtiani and Magnanti 1981)).
In the first part of our study, we consider using logic (binary) constraints whose aim is
to more equitably distribute equilibrium flows where more than one TEP solution exists.
This is one of several applications for a transportation grid operator to better manage the
network. Additional logic constraints for traffic equilibria are also possible. For example,
threshold effects can also be modeled for traffic equilibrium whereby if the traffic level rises
beyond a certain point an additional cost could be incurred.
In the context of energy markets, complementarity problems are often obtained by com-
bining the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the optimization problems solved by
players in this market together with market-clearing constraints (Gabriel et al. 2012). In
the presence of binary variables which may represent the ON/OFF statuses of power gener-
ators, it is not obvious how one can achieve an equilibrium as the KKT conditions are not
valid. However, (Gabriel, Conejo, Ruiz and Siddiqui 2013, Gabriel, Siddiqui, Conejo and
Ruiz 2013) suggest that one can attempt to find an equilibrium solution by first relaxing the
binary-constrained variables to their continuous analogues, taking the KKT conditions for
this relaxed problem, converting these conditions to disjunctive-constraints form (Fortuny-
Amat and McCarl 1981), and then solving them along with the original integer (binary)
restrictions. The solutions obtained in this way are not guaranteed to be optimal for in-
dividual players’ optimization problems, but rather are the binary-constrained solutions to
the overall complementarity system being modeled. As such, we could consider them as sta-
tionary points for each of the players. The approach has since then yielded several studies
of the discretely-constrained mixed linear complementarity problem (DC-MLCP), see for
example (Ruiz et al. 2012, Fomeni et al. 2015).
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In the second part of this paper, we consider the equilibrium problem of power markets
with the inclusion of a storage operator. The model considers a multi-period power supply-
demand balance with on-peak and off-peak demand periods. It then computes the optimal
schedules for the production level of each producer and the storage level, as well as the
prices of electricity and of storing the power for each time period, while ensuring that the
demand is always satisfied. Our contribution in this part of the paper is in showing that the
presence of a storage operator in the market is beneficial in terms of stabilizing the price of
electricity during peak demand periods. More precisely, we consider the storage operator as
a service provider, whose role is to support the production and the transmission. This means
that this operator only stores electric power sent by the producers and then releases it in
the future to be sold by the same producers. We also consider the alternative that instead
of resorting directly to storage the producers could increase their production capacity in
order to meet the demand. Therefore, we analyze the profitability of the storage operator
in two different scenarios. In one scenario, we assume that the producers can respond to
the demand by increasing their production capacity. In the other scenario, we assume that
it would be a lot more expensive for the producers to expand their capacity than to use
the storage unit. Our computational results show that in both cases it is possible for the
storage operator to be profitable while having a stabilizing impact on the prices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some of the
literature relevant to this research. In Section 3 we present how the logic constraints can
be added to the traffic equilibrium problem. In Section 4 we study the impact of a storage
operator in a power system network. Finally, we present some conclusions and discussions
in Section 5.
2 Literature review
2.1 The Traffic Equilibrium Problem
Many different mathematical formulations have been presented in the literature for the TEP
initially proposed by Wardrop (Wardrop 1952). One of the early references is by Dafermos
(Dafermos 1980) who formulated it as a variational inequality (VI). Aashtiani and Magnanti
(Aashtiani and Magnanti 1981) showed that under the assumption of positive cost functions,
the Wardrop TEP conditions could be formulated as the following complementarity problem
(CP): find h and u such that:
0 ≤ C(h)− Γu ⊥ h ≥ 0, (1a)
0 ≤ ΓTh−D(u) ⊥ u ≥ 0, (1b)
where Γ = [γpi] is the path-OD incidence matrix with γpi = 1 if path p serves OD pair i
and zero otherwise, h = (. . . , hp, . . .) the vector of flows on each path p, u = (. . . , ui, . . .)
the vector of minimum costs for each OD pair i, Di(u) the demand function of OD pair i,
and Cp(h) the cost function of path p.
Some models of the TEP (Aashtiani and Magnanti 1981, Magnanti 1984, Florian 1986)
assume that the cost of each path is simply the sum of the costs of the arcs on this path (the
additive cost model). In other words, C(h) = ∆T c(f), where c(f) is the cost function of the
arcs, f = (. . . , fa, . . .) the vector of flows on each arc a and ∆ = [δap] the arc-path incidence
matrix with δap = 1 if arc a is on path p and zero otherwise. Note that if both functions
c(.) and D(.) are linear, then (1) is equivalent to a linear complementarity problem (LCP).
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It has been noted in (Gabriel and Bernstein 1997, Bernstein and Gabriel 1997) that
there are many real-life applications, such as toll pricing, where the cost of a path is not
necessarily the sum of the costs of each arc along the path, i.e. that the additive cost model
may not be appropriate. Various alternative forms of the function C(h) have been proposed
in the literature, see for example (Gabriel and Bernstein 1997, Lo and Chen 2000b, Larsson
et al. 2002). Several studies of traffic equilibria have been built around the non-additive cost
models, we refer the interested reader to (Suwansirikul et al. 1987, Meng and Yang 2002, Lo
and Chen 2000b,a, Caggiani and Ottomanelli 2011, Chen et al. 2010, 2001, Agdeppa et al.
2007, Chen et al. 1999) for more details.
In this paper, we propose new ways of balancing the flows in a traffic network by finding
more equitable equilibrium solutions when there is more than one solution. There are
many benefits to incorporating such logic constraints in a traffic equilibrium. First, as
described earlier, some transportation planners could attempt to more equitably balance
the equilibrium flows with these sorts of constraints. Additionally, threshold effects could
also be modeled for traffic equilibrium whereby if the traffic level rose beyond a certain point
an additional cost could be incurred or some other behavioral action modeled.
2.2 Power Systems with Storage
The increase in prices and volatility of electricity have raised a huge interest in the potential
economic opportunity of electricity storage. A recent report by the U.S. Department of
Energy (DoE 2013) highlights how energy storage can be used to support the generation,
distribution and transmission needs of a power grid. Several other works have also been
conducted to show the profitability of electricity storage. A review by Zucker et al. (Zucker
et al. 2013) assesses the value of storage in electricity markets in different ways. This
review points out that most of the literature in this direction has focused on studying
the profitability from a storage investor’s point of view whereby the main concern is in
buying inexpensive electricity available during off-peak demand periods and selling it back
at a higher price during on-peak demand periods. Sioshansi et al. (Sioshansi et al. 2009)
consider the impact of large storage devices and examine how the use of power storage can
decrease on-peak and increase off-peak prices, which diminishes the value of arbitrage. This
price-shifting effect is related to the fact that the storage operator has the role of temporal
arbitrage, that is, buying power during the off-peak demand periods and selling it during
the on-peak demand periods (instead of just providing the storage services to support the
supply as we consider in the current paper). Walawalkar et al. (Walawalkar et al. 2007)
analyze the economic case of the installation of some specific storage technology in New
York State’s power market. Similar analyses are conducted in (Chacra et al. 2005, Sugihara
et al. 2013). Barton and Infield (Barton and Infield 2004) focus on the use of storage to
maximize the penetration of intermittent renewable generation in the grid. Other evaluation
of the benefits of energy storage include (Bayod-Ru´jula 2009, Wade et al. 2010, Zucker et al.
2013). A summary of different existing applications of storage in energy markets is given in
(Sioshansi et al. 2012).
In our research, we consider an energy storage operator as a service provider located at
a node of a power system network that might experience congestion. This storage operator
only stores power sent by energy producers and then releases it in the future to be sold by the
same producers. Though the storage operator is a profit maximizer, the network operator
clears the price of storing the power as well as how much power from each producer should
be stored. We show that the presence of such a storage operator supports the operation of
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the power grid, and also helps stabilize the price of electricity and avoid the price-shifting
effect noted in (Sioshansi et al. 2009).
2.3 Solving Binary-Constrained Linear Complementarity Prob-
lems
Both the problems of traffic equilibrium and power market with storage will be shown to
be instances of a binary-constrained mixed linear complementarity problem (BC-MLCP)
which we now explain. More formally, the mathematical formulation of the BC-MLCP
is described as follows. Given the vector q =
(
q1
q2
)
∈ Rn and the partitioned matrix
A =
(
A11 A12
A21 A22
)
∈ Rn×n, find
(
z1
z2
)
∈ Rn1 × Rn2 , where n1 + n2 = n, such that:
0 ≤ q1 + ( A11 A12 )( z1
z2
)
⊥ z1 ≥ 0 (2a)
0 = q2 +
(
A21 A22
)( z1
z2
)
, z2 free, (2b)
where some components of the vector
(
z1
z2
)
are constrained to be binary. z1 and z2 are
called the nonnegative complementarity variables and the free variables, respectively.
In (Fomeni et al. 2015), the authors developed a solution method for the BC-MLCP
considering the fact that solving this problem is equivalent to finding a vector that satisfies
both the complementarity and the binary constraints. Therefore, we define a set F to be
the set all the vectors that satisfy the above constraints (2) with the additional requirement
that some components of the vector
(
z1
z2
)
are constrained to be binary. Given that
the complementarity constraints in this set can be seen as quadratic equations, we can
then, following the idea of the RLT (Reformulation and Linearization Technique) approach
(Sherali and Adams 1990, 1994, 1998), introduce new variables to replace all the quadratic
terms in these equations. We then relax the quadratic requirements by replacing them with
the McCormick inequalities (McCormick 1979). This yields a new set F˜ , which can now be
seen as the RLT relaxation of set F . The nice feature about this latter set, is that, it is
convex, and one can more easily solve any optimization problem over it rather than F .
The proposed solution approach for the BC-MLCP proceeds in three main steps. The
first step consists of reducing the upper bounds of each complementarity variable using
the bound refinement procedure of Sherali and Tuncbilek (Sherali and Tuncbilek 1997).
This step enables us to get tighter relaxations of the problem. More precisely, we find the
maximum value of each complementarity variable by maximizing it over the set F˜ . The
solution of such an LP enables us to have a new upper bound of the complementarity
variable. In the second step, we solve a series of LPs over the set F˜ which enables us to
replace some of the complementarity constraints with linear equations. Finally, we solve a
mixed integer linear optimization problem (MILP) that is equivalent to the original BC-
MLCP with a reduced number of complementarity constraints. We refer the interested
reader to (Fomeni et al. 2015) for more details of the methods and for the full description
of the algorithm.
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It is important to mention that there are at least two other methods that can be used
to solve BC-MLCP instances. The first one is the disjunctive constraints approach (or big-
M method) that consists of replacing each complementarity constraint with two disjunc-
tive constraints and solve the resulting problem as a MILP with a zero objective function
(Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981). The other approach is the RLT-based MILP reformula-
tion approach of Sherali et al. (Sherali et al. 1998). This approach consists of linearizing the
complementarity constraints using the RLT approach and then solving the resulting MILP
where the total violation of complementarity is minimized (this will be zero if the problem
is feasible). A thorough comparative study of the three methods for solving the BC-MLCP
was already presented in (Fomeni et al. 2015). This comparison showed that, in terms of
computational time, the RLT-based MILP approach in (Sherali et al. 1998) is dominated
by both the approach in (Fomeni et al. 2015) and by the disjunctive constraints approach
(Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981). On the other hand, the disjunctive constraints approach
(Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981) dominates the approach in (Fomeni et al. 2015) on most
BC-MLCP instances, but there are some instances where the disjunctive constraints ap-
proach (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981) is dominated by the approach in (Fomeni et al.
2015). Furthermore the efficiency of the disjunctive constraints approach (Fortuny-Amat
and McCarl 1981) depends to a large extent on the application-specific choice of the pa-
rameter M . Considering the overall results reported in (Fomeni et al. 2015), we used the
algorithm proposed in that paper for this study. Our computational experience shows that
the performance of the technique in (Fomeni et al. 2015) is competitive with that of the dis-
junctive constraints approach (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981) for the types of instances
considered in this paper.
3 Logic Constraints in Traffic Equilibrium Models
In this section, we show how one can add logic constraints to a complementarity model of the
traffic equilibrium problem described earlier. Such an approach can have several important
applications such as balancing equilibrium flows more equitably or modeling threshold events
to name just two. We use the small example given below as illustration.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the cost of each path is the sum of the costs
of the arcs along this path, i.e. C(h) = ∆T c(f) in (1). In all the examples in this section
we choose the cost and demand functions to be defined as follows: ca(f) = fa − l and
Di(u) = si−ui, where l and s are some (given) parameters. With these choices, the MLCP
formulation (1) of the problem is:
0 ≤ Ax+ q ⊥ x ≥ 0,
where
A =
(
∆T∆ −Γ
ΓT I
)
, q =
( −∆T l
−s
)
and x =
(
h
u
)
3.1 Small Example
We consider the following small but illustrative example. The network for this example,
shown in Figure 1, is taken from (Lo and Chen 2000b). The set of arcs is A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
where arc 1 goes from node 1 to node 3, etc. The set of all OD pairs is J = {1 − 5, 2 − 5}
and the set of paths (we use arc numbers in the names of paths instead of node numbers)
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Figure 1: Traffic network 1
connecting the OD pairs is P = {1→ 3→ 5, 1→ 4→ 5, 2→ 3→ 5, 2→ 4→ 5}, while the
arc-path and path-OD incidence matrices are, respectively:
∆ =

1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
 and Γ =

1 0
1 0
0 1
0 1
 .
Four preliminary tests with this network example were carried out for different choices
of l and s corresponding to different values of q =
( −∆T l
−s
)
as given below.
• Test 1: q = −(24, 24, 24, 24, 30, 40)T ,
• Test 2: q = −(24, 24, 24, 24, 40, 40)T ,
• Test 3: q = −(40, 20, 15, 20, 40, 40)T ,
• Test 4: q = −(40, 20, 15, 20, 40, 80)T .
For Test 1 and Test 2, the cost functions are the same for all the paths, but the demand
constant of the OD pair 1− 5 is lower than that of the OD pair 2− 5. While, for Test 3 we
make the paths 1→ 3→ 5 and 2→ 4→ 5 more expensive than their alternative paths and
equal demand for the two OD pairs. Finally, the cost functions for Test 4 are the same as
for Test 3, but the demand is higher for the OD pair 2− 5.
The results of these tests are presented in Table 1. In these results, the equilibrium
solutions for Test 1 suggests that all the vehicles going from 1 to 5 only use the path
1→ 4→ 5, while for the OD pair 2 − 5 a large proportion of vehicles are using the path
2→ 3→ 5 vs. few vehicles that are using the alternative path 2→ 4→ 5 for the same cost.
A similar observation can be done for Test 2 where, all the vehicles are simply ignoring the
existence of the alternative paths. Ideally for such examples one would like to have a more
equitable equilibrium or division of the flow if at all possible. This is where it can be helpful
to add some logic constraints to the system for equity balancing. In some cases it might not
be possible to impose such constraints without increasing the costs for some vehicles. For
example, in Test 3 and Test 4 we can see that the paths with zero flow have costs that are
larger than the minimum costs (this depicts the Wardrop equilibrium condition). Therefore
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redirecting some vehicles onto those paths will be penalizing them in terms of the costs.
Meng and Yang (Meng and Yang 2002) also noted this kind of effect in network capacity
improvement. In such situations, it could be beneficial for the network operator to propose
a discount to vehicles to use the alternative paths in order to achieve the desired equity. A
thorough explanation of how we add logic constraints to the model is presented below in
Subsection 3.2.
Table 1: Results of preliminary test with Network 1
Test Num. h1→3→5 h1→4→5 h2→3→5 h2→4→5 u1−5 u2−5
Test 1 0.0 9.3 11.8 2.5 20.7 25.7
Path cost 20.7 20.7 25.7 25.7
Test 2 0.0 12.8 12.8 0.0 27.2 27.2
Path cost 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.2
Test 3 17.3 0.0 0.0 10.7 22.7 29.3
Path cost 22.7 36 41 29.3
Test 4 14.2 0.0 1.2 20.5 25.7 58.2
Path cost 25.7 50.7 58.2 58.2
3.2 Imposing Equity Constraints on the Small Example
In this subsection, we consider Test 1 in Table 1 which showed that all the vehicles on the
OD pair 1 − 5 only use the path 1 → 4 → 5. However, one may wish to redirect some of
the equilibrium flow to the path 1 → 3 → 5 without compromising travel cost. Therefore,
it makes sense to plan to have a certain proportion of the traffic for this OD pair redirected
to the path 1 → 3 → 5. In order to do this, we add the following logic constraints to the
problem (1). We define the binary variable
x1→4→51−5 =
{
1 if h1→4→5 > 0
0 if h1→4→5 = 0.
This binary condition can then be enforced in the problem by the following complementarity
condition
0 ≤ h1→4→5 ⊥ 1− x1→4→51−5 ≥ 0. (3)
In order to include the logic constraints as stated earlier, we add the following constraints
α−x1→4→51−5 (h1→3→5 + h1→4→5) ≤ x1→4→51−5 h1→3→5 ≤ α+x1→4→51−5 (h1→3→5 + h1→4→5), (4)
where α− and α+ are parameters that represent respectively the lower and upper admissible
proportion of the traffic to be redirected to the path 1→ 3→ 5. Here 0 ≤ α− ≤ α+ ≤ 1.
These parameters could be defined by the network operators depending on their equity
preferences. It can be seen from these conditions that if the flow on path 1→ 4→ 5 is zero,
then the above constraints are not active. To see this assume that h1→4→5 = 0, then (4)
reduces to
α−x1→4→51−5 h1→3→5 ≤ x1→4→51−5 h1→3→5 ≤ α+x1→4→51−5 h1→3→5,
or
(α− − 1)x1→4→51−5 h1→3→5 ≤ 0 (5a)
(1− α+)x1→4→51−5 h1→3→5 ≤ 0. (5b)
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• For (5a), since (α− − 1) ≤ 0 =⇒ x1→4→51−5 h1→3→5 ≥ 0 which is always the case as
x1→4→51−5 ∈ {0, 1} and h1→3→5 ≥ 0.
• For (5b), since (1 − α+) ≥ 0 =⇒ x1→4→51−5 h1→3→5 ≤ 0 which in light of x1→4→51−5 ∈
{0, 1} and h1→3→5 ≥ 0 means that x1→4→51−5 0 or h1→3→5 = 0 or both. In the former
case, via (3) we see that h1→4→5 = 0 which is already true. In the latter case,
h1→3→5 = 0 so that means there is no flow for OD pair 1− 5 which can reasonably be
excluded as an extreme case.
Conversely, of h1→4→5 > 0 then by (3), we know that x1→4→51−5 = 1 and that (4) reduces to
α− ≤ h1→3→5
h1→3→5 + h1→4→5
≤ α+
as desired. Thus, (3) and (4) guarantee that for the OD pair 1− 5, there is a better equity
of the flow between the tow paths 1→ 3→ 5 and 1→ 4→ 5, both serving this OD pair.
We have implemented this model for several values of α− and α+ and the results pre-
sented in Table 2 show how the model redirects some of the flow for OD pair 1−5 to the path
1 → 3 → 5. Consider for example when α− = 0.1, α+ = 1.0. Then, the total flow for OD
pair 1−5 is 9.30. 10% of this equilibrium flow must go along the path 1→ 3→ 5 (assuming
that h1→4→5 > 0); this corresponds to the value h1→3→5 = 0.93 and it is achieved without
increasing the minimum cost of 20.7 for OD pair 1− 5. This pattern is repeated for all the
changing α− values in Table 4, namely h1→3→5 takes the value of α−(h→3→5 + h→4→5). It
is also important to note the changes that are occurring also on the paths for the OD pair
2− 5 even though we are enforcing equity only on a path of the OD pair 1− 5. This kind of
indirect interaction can also be noticed in our second TEP example presented in Subsection
3.3. Note that the above example can easily be generalized.
Table 2: Adding logic constraint on Network 3
α− α+ h1→3→5 h1→4→5 h2→3→5 h2→4→5 u1−5 u2−5
0.0 1.0 0.0 9.3 11.8 2.5 20.7 25.7
0.1 1.0 0.93 8.37 10.87 3.43 20.7 25.7
0.2 1.0 1.86 7.44 9.94 4.36 20.7 25.7
0.3 1.0 2.79 6.51 9.01 5.29 20.7 25.7
0.4 1.0 3.72 5.58 8.08 6.22 20.7 25.7
0.5 1.0 4.65 4.65 7.15 7.15 20.7 25.7
More generally, let i be an OD pair in a traffic network. Let Pi be the set of paths of
the OD pair i with |Pi| ≥ 2. Let p0 ∈ Pi be a path of the OD pair i from which the flow
is to be redirected, also let pk ∈ Pi, pk 6= p0 be another path of the OD pair i for which we
want the flow to be within a certain range whenever the flow of the path p0 is positive. We
define the following binary variable:
xp0i =
{
1 if hp0 > 0
0 if hp0 = 0.
Conditions to impose deviation from the path p0 to the path pk when connecting the OD
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pair i are added to traffic equilibrium problem (1) using the following constraints:
0 ≤ hp0 ⊥ 1− xp0i ≥ 0 (6a)
xp0i hpk ≥ α−p0ixp0i
hp0 + ∑
q∈Pi
q 6=p0
hq
 (6b)
xp0i hpk ≤ α+p0ixp0i
hp0 + ∑
q∈Pi
q 6=p0
hq
 (6c)
xp0i ∈ {0, 1}. (6d)
Therefore, a traffic equilibrium model with logic constraints to redirect a proportion of the
traffic from a path p0 to a path pk of the same OD pair i ∈ J can be modeled by combining
equations (1) and (6).
3.3 Large Example: Sioux Falls Network
In this subsection, we illustrate the application of logic constrained traffic equilibria using the
Sioux Falls network (Github 2015) shown in Figure 2. We assume that there is a congested
portion of the network where the network operator may need to re-direct a proportion of
the traffic to an alternative road with same minimal travel cost.
We assume that the congested portion consists of the red arcs in Figure 2 with the OD
pairs and the set of arcs being respectively
J = {3− 7, 3− 18, 12− 7}
and
A = {6, 9, 12, 13, 16, 24, 20, 25, 26, 22, 47, 18, 54, 36, 32, 29, 50, 30, 52}.
For the sake of readability and traceability, we further assume that the admissible paths
connecting the three OD pairs are:
For OD pair 3-7 :

p1 := 6→ 9→ 12→ 16→ 20
p2 := 6→ 9→ 13→ 24→ 20
p3 := 6→ 9→ 12→ 16→ 22→ 50→ 54
p4 := 6→ 9→ 13→ 25→ 29→ 50→ 54
For OD pair 3-18 :

p5 := 6→ 9→ 12→ 16→ 20→ 18
p6 := 6→ 9→ 13→ 25→ 29→ 50
p7 := 6→ 9→ 12→ 16→ 22→ 50
p8 := 6→ 9→ 13→ 24→ 20→ 18
p9 := 6→ 9→ 13→ 24→ 22→ 50
For OD pair 12-7 :

p10 := 36→ 32→ 30→ 52→ 50→ 54
p11 := 36→ 32→ 29→ 50→ 54
p12 := 36→ 32→ 26→ 24→ 20
p13 := 36→ 32→ 29→ 47→ 20
p14 := 36→ 32→ 30→ 52→ 47→ 20
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Figure 2: Sioux Falls Network
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Table 3: Applying logic constraints on a congested portion of the Sioux Falls Network
OD: 3-7 OD: 3-18 OD: 12-7
α− α+ h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14
0 1 flow 0.00 0.00 228.72 233.78 224.64 98.73 0.00 0.00 101.64 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.1 1 flow 0.00 0.00 129.98 332.52 122.99 0.00 200.37 101.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.2 1 flow 0.00 0.00 129.98 332.52 122.99 0.00 200.37 101.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.3 1 flow 0.00 0.00 129.98 332.52 122.99 0.00 200.37 101.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.4 1 flow 0.00 0.00 129.98 332.52 122.99 0.00 200.37 101.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.5 1 INFEASIBLE
0.4 0.8 flow 0.00 0.00 129.98 332.52 122.99 0.00 200.37 101.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.3 0.5 flow 129.98 332.52 195.86 0.00 127.5 28.77 72.87 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.3 0.4 flow 0.00 0.00 129.98 332.52 195.86 0.00 127.5 28.77 72.87 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.2 0.4 flow 0.00 0.00 129.98 332.52 224.63 0.00 98.73 0.00 101.64 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.2 0.3 flow 0.00 0.00 129.98 332.52 224.63 0.00 98.73 0.00 101.64 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.2 0.2 flow 0.00 0.00 245.35 217.14 122.99 115.37 85 101.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.1 0.2 flow 0.00 0.00 186.21 276.28 224.63 56.23 42.5 0.00 101.64 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.1 0.1 flow 0.00 0.00 287.86 174.64 122.99 157.87 42.5 101.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 370.9 137.86 235.19
cost 350.33 350.33 37.49 37.49 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 74.98 583.64 583.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
Although these paths are not the only ones connecting the OD pairs, they may represent
the paths used by the vast majority of the drivers.
As in the previous example, the cost and demand functions are given by the formulae
ca(f) = fa − l and Di(ui) = si − ui, where the values of the parameter l for the 19 arcs in
A are respectively
l = (200, 500, 800, 800, 800, 800, 1000, 800, 800, 800, 800, 500, 500, 800, 500, 400, 300, 500, 300),
and s = 500 e with e equal to the all-ones vector. The computational results we obtained
are reported in Table 3 where we denote the flow on path pi by hi.
We first solved the standard complementarity-based traffic equilibrium model (1) with
no logic constraints and obtained the solution reported in the first row of Table 3 where
α− = 0.0 and α+ = 1. In this solution, one can see that for OD pairs 3− 7 and 12− 7 the
paths with zero flows have associated costs larger than the minimum. On the other hand,
the costs of the paths of the OD-pair 3 − 18 are all equal while the flows on the paths p7
and p8 are equal to zero.
Next we focused on path p7 and aimed to re-direct a proportion of the traffic for the OD
pair 3−18 onto that path whenever there is a positive flow on the path p5. This corresponds
to solving an extended version of the TEP model (1) that includes logic constraints as
described in Subsection 3.2. We report results using different values of α+ and α− as shown
in Table 3. Note that when α− ≥ 0.5 the problem becomes infeasible, which means that it
is not possible to re-direct 50% or more of the flow from p5 onto the other paths.
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We observe that re-directing traffic to path p7 with no upper limit often results in zero
flow on path p6, which is equivalent to path p7 in the sense that all their arcs have same
values for the parameter l in the cost function. This suggests that some of the flow assigned
to path p7 could equivalently be assigned to path p6 without violating the Wardrop principle
of equilibrium.
The results also suggest that for some values of α+ and α− one can more equitably
balance the flows between the paths of the OD-pair 3− 18. For example, for α+ = 0.2 and
α− = 0.2 the flows are reasonably well balanced between paths p5, p6, p7 and p8. We also
note that while equity is achieved to the desired level (for each choice of α+ and α−) for
the OD-pair 3− 18, there is also a variation in the flows of the paths of the OD pair 3− 7
(in the four “OD: 3-7” columns in the table). This interaction is certainly due to the fact
that these two OD pairs use almost the same arcs.
Although this paper is not concerned with the algorithmic aspects of computing logic-
constrained equilibria, we conclude this section with some brief remarks concerning the time
required to obtain the results reported in Table 3 so that the reader can have an idea of
the computational cost involved. It took on average 0.56 seconds to compute the solution
in each of the rows in Table 3 using the approach from (Fomeni et al. 2015) described in
Section 2.3, while the disjunctive constraints approach (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981)
took on average 0.19 seconds for the same instances. It is however important to note that
the approach in (Fomeni et al. 2015) is parameter-free while the disjunctive constraints
approach (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981) requires a careful choice of the parameter M .
A more thorough comparison of the approaches to compute logic-constrained equilibria can
be found in (Fomeni et al. 2015).
4 Equilibria in Power Markets with Storage
In this section we consider an energy storage operator in a power market as a service
provider, whose role is to support the generation and transmission as well as to help stabilize
the price of electricity during the on-peak demand periods. Previous papers have focused
on studying the economic opportunity for a storage operator in a power system network in
terms of buying electricity during the off-peak demand periods inexpensively and selling it
during the on-peak demand periods to make a profit. This approach diminishes the value of
arbitrage as it shifts the load from the on-peak demand periods to off-peak demand periods,
see (Sioshansi et al. 2009).
We illustrate such a system using a small example with a network of two nodes, two
producers and a storage operator at node 2 as illustrated in Figure 3.
Node 1
producer A
Node 2
producer B
Storage Unit: S
Figure 3: A two-node power system network with a storage operator
In Figure 3, we have two nodes and two producers A and B, and electricity can only
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be transmitted from node 1 to node 2. There is a storage operator located at node 2 who
provides storage facilities to both producers. We assume that the transmission capacity
of the network as well as the generation capacity of the producers are limited in terms of
satisfying the demand at peak times. We consider two time periods: an off-peak period
followed by an on-peak period. During the off-peak period, either producer can send a part
of its production to the storage unit which will then be released during the on-peak demand
period to be sold on the market at node 2. Given the economic opportunity of storage,
the producers could respond by expanding their generation capacity. We investigate the
profitability of the storage operator in two scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume
that capacity expansion is not an option for the producers, while in the second scenario, we
assume that the producers are willing to expand their production capacities if the associated
cost can be competitive with the operating cost of storage.
4.1 Model Description
In this example, each producer maximizes its profit by choosing appropriate nonnegative
levels of production qAt1 and q
B
t2, sales s
A
t1 and s
B
t2, storage and flow variables b
A, bB and
fAt,12 subject to their minimum and maximum production limits, and consistency between
sales, production, storage and flow. While the network transportation operator and the
storage operator, respectively decide on the transmission level gt,12 and the storage level h
S
that maximize their profits. More formally, each player solves an optimization problem as
follows.
• Producer A:
max
sAt1,q
A
t1,f
A
t,12,E
A
t1,
bA,vAt1,y
A
t1
Rev(A)− Cost(A) (7a)
s.t. vAt1q
A
min ≤ qAt1 ≤ vAt1qAmax for t = 1, 2
(
λAt,min, λ
A
t,max
)
(7b)
yAt1E
A
min ≤ EAt1 ≤ yAt1EAmax for t = 1, 2
(
ξAt,min, ξ
A
t,max
)
(7c)
sAt1 = q
A
t1 + E
A
t1 − fAt,12 − bA for t = 1
(
δAt1
)
(7d)
sAt1 = q
A
t1 + E
A
t1 − fAt,12 for t = 2
(
δAt1
)
(7e)
yAt1 ≤ vAt1 for t = 1, 2 (lAt1) (7f)
sAt1, q
A
t1, f
A
t,12, b
A, EAt1 ≥ 0 for t = 1, 2 (7g)
vAt1, y
A
t1 ∈ {0, 1}. for t = 1, 2, (7h)
where
Rev(A) =
2∑
t=1
[
pit1s
A
t1 + pit2f
A
t,12
]
+ pi22b
A,
and
Cost(A) =
2∑
t=1
[
γA1 q
A
t1 + (τt,12 + τ
reg
12 ) f
A
t,12 + ρ
AEAt1
]
+ (τ1,12 + τ
reg
12 ) b
A + ωSbA.
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• Producer B:
max
sBt2,q
B
t2,E
B
t2,
bB,vBt2,y
B
t2
Rev(B)− Cost(B) (8a)
s.t. vBt2q
B
min ≤ qBt2 ≤ vBt2qBmax for t = 1, 2
(
λBt,min, λ
B
t,max
)
(8b)
yBt2E
B
min ≤ EBt2 ≤ yBt2EBmax for t = 1, 2
(
ξBt,min, ξ
B
t,max
)
(8c)
sBt2 = q
B
t2 + E
B
t2 − bB for t = 1
(
δBt2
)
(8d)
sBt2 = q
B
t2 + E
B
t2 for t = 2
(
δBt2
)
(8e)
yBt2 ≤ vBt2 for t = 1, 2 (lBt2) (8f)
sBt2, q
B
t2, b
B , EBt2 ≥ 0 for t = 1, 2 (8g)
vBt2, y
B
t2 ∈ {0, 1}. for t = 1, 2, (8h)
where
Rev(B) =
2∑
t=1
pit2s
B
t2 + pi22b
B ,
and
Cost(B) =
2∑
t=1
[
γB1 q
B
t2 + ρ
BEBt2
]
+ ωSbB .
• Transportation System Operator:
max
gt,12
∑
t
[
(τt,12 + τ
reg
12 )gt,12 − γTSOgt,12
]
s.t. gt,12 ≤ g¯12 for t = 1, 2 (t,12)
gt,12 ≥ 0 for t = 1, 2
• Storage Operator:
max
hS
ωShS − γShS
s.t. hS ≤ σS (θS)
hS ≥ 0
In the above definition EAt1 and E
B
t2 are the amount of power produced by A and B
from the expanded production unit during time period t. τReg12 represents the nonnegative
regulated tariff for using the network from node 1 to node 2; this is a fixed parameter.
The complementarity model determines τt,12 and ω
S , respectively the congestion tariff for
sending power from node 1 to node 2 at time period t and the unit tariff for using the storage
facilities. γ is a parameter representing the unit cost of production with the superscript
relating to the particular player. Finally ρA and ρB are the unit cost of production of the
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expanded production units of A and B. Note that constraints (7f) and (8f) are included in
the model to ensure that the expanded production units cannot be switched on while the
existing the production units are off.
In addition to the optimization problems for these four players, there are the following
market-clearing conditions that force supply to equal demand:
0 =
[
sAt1
]−Dt1(pit1), pit1 free , t = 1, 2, (9a)
0 =
[
sBt2 + f
A
t,12
]−Dt2(pit2), pit2 free, t = 1, (9b)
0 =
[
sBt2 + f
A
t,12 + h
S
]−Dt2(pit2), pit2 free, t = 2. (9c)
Note that the terms in square brackets are the net supply at each node (assuming no losses)
and Dtn(pitn), t, n = 1, 2 are the nodal demands that depend on the price pitn.
The last part of the equilibrium are the market-clearing conditions that balance the
network flows as well as the storage flows:
0 = gt,12 −
(
fAt,12 + b
A
)
, τt,12 free, t = 1, (10a)
0 = gt,12 − fAt,12, τt,12 free, t = 2, (10b)
0 = hS − (bA + bB) , ωS free. (10c)
By relaxing the binary requirement of variables vAt1, v
B
t2, y
A
t1 and y
B
t2, the KKT conditions
for each of the above optimization problems are as follows.
• Producers A at node 1.
0 ≤ −pit1 + δAt1 ⊥ sAt1 ≥ 0 (11a)
0 ≤ γA + (λAt,max − λAt,min)− δAt1 ⊥ qAt1 ≥ 0 (11b)
0 ≤ −pit2 + (τReg12 + τt,12) + δAt1 ⊥ fAt,12 ≥ 0 (11c)
0 ≤ −pit+1,2 + (τReg12 + τt,12) + ωS + δAt1 ⊥ bA ≥ 0 (11d)
0 ≤ ρA + (ξAt,max − ξAt,min)− δAt1 ⊥ EAt1 ≥ 0 (11e)
0 ≤ vAt1qAmax − qAt1 ⊥ λAt,max ≥ 0 (11f)
0 ≤ qAt1 − vAt1qAmin ⊥ λAt,min ≥ 0 (11g)
0 ≤ yAt1EAmax − EAt1 ⊥ ξAt,max ≥ 0 (11h)
0 ≤ EAt1 − yAt1EAmin ⊥ ξAt,min ≥ 0 (11i)
0 ≤ yAt1 − vAt1 ⊥ lAt1 ≥ 0 (11j)
0 ≤ λAt,maxqAmax − λAt,minqAmin − lAt1 ⊥ vAt1 ≥ 0 (11k)
0 ≤ ξAt,maxEAmax − ξAt,minEAmin + lAt1 ⊥ yAt1 ≥ 0 (11l)
0 ≤ 1− vAt1 ⊥ ηAt1 ≥ 0, (11m)
0 ≤ 1− yAt1 ⊥ βAt1 ≥ 0, (11n)
0 = sAt1 − qAt1 − EAt1 + fAt,12 + bA, δAt1 free. (11o)
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• Producers B at node 2.
0 ≤ −pit2 + δBt2 ⊥ sBt2 ≥ 0, (12a)
0 ≤ γB + (λBt,max − λBt,min)− δBt2 ⊥ qBt2 ≥ 0, (12b)
0 ≤ −pit+1,2 + ωS + δBt2 ⊥ bB ≥ 0, (12c)
0 ≤ ρB + (ξBt,max − ξBt,min)− δBt2 ⊥ EBt2 ≥ 0, (12d)
0 ≤ vBt2qBmax − qBt2 ⊥ λBt,max ≥ 0, (12e)
0 ≤ qBt2 − vBt2qBmin ⊥ λBt,min ≥ 0, (12f)
0 ≤ yBt2EBmax − EBt2 ⊥ ξBt,max ≥ 0, (12g)
0 ≤ EBt2 − yBt2EBmin ⊥ ξBt,min ≥ 0, (12h)
0 ≤ yBt2 − vBt2 ⊥ lBt2 ≥ 0 (12i)
0 ≤ λBt,maxqBmax − λBt,minqBmin − lBt2 ⊥ vBt1 ≥ 0 (12j)
0 ≤ ξBt,maxEBmax − ξBt,minEBmin + lBt2 ⊥ yBt1 ≥ 0 (12k)
0 ≤ 1− vBt2 ⊥ ηBt2 ≥ 0, (12l)
0 ≤ 1− yBt2 ⊥ βBt2 ≥ 0, (12m)
0 = sBt2 + b
B − qBt2 − EBt2, δBt2 free. (12n)
• The TSO:
0 ≤ −τReg12 − τt,12 + γTSO + t,12 ⊥ gt,12 ≥ 0, (13a)
0 ≤ g¯12 − gt,12 ⊥ t,12 ≥ 0. (13b)
• The storage operator:
0 ≤ −ωS − ωReg + γS + θS ⊥ hS ≥ 0, (14a)
0 ≤ σS − hS ⊥ θS ≥ 0. (14b)
We carried out several tests for this example with demand function given by Dtn(pitn) =
atn − btnpitn. The values of the other parameters used for these tests are as follows.
γA = 7, γB = 7, γTSO = 1, γS = 0.5;
a11 = 20, a21 = 40, a12 = 30, a22 = 80;
b11 = 0.1, b21 = 0.1, b12 = 0.1, b22 = 0.1;
qAmax = 60, q
A
min = 5, q
B
max = 40, q
B
min = 5;
EAmax = 25, E
A
min = 5, E
B
max = 25, E
B
min = 5;
g¯12 = 30, τ
Reg = 0.5.
It can be seen from these parameters that the demand (Dtn(pitn) = atn− btnpitn) during
the second time period is very high at node 2 (a22 = 80). After supplying up to 40 units
of electricity to node 1, producer A can supply up to 20 units of electricity, which coupled
with the production capacity of existing generators of B will still not be enough to satisfy
17
the demand at a low cost1. Therefore, either production capacity expansion and/or storage
may be needed for relatively low prices. In the following subsection, we report on numerical
experiments whose output was used to analyse profitability and to value storage. We look
at both cases where the producers can and cannot expand their production capacities along
with storage activity.
4.2 Computational Results
It is important to point out that our computational experiments here consist of solving the
BC-MLCP which includes of the KKT equations (11), (12), (13) (14) together with the
market clearing conditions (9) and (10) after re-imposing the binary conditions on variables
vAt1, v
B
t2, y
A
t1 and y
B
t2. This BC-MLCP is solved using our previously developed algorithm
(see (Fomeni et al. 2015)). It may or may not be the case that the players have an incentive
to deviate from the solution obtained in this manner. Thus we can only say in general,
without more specific assumptions, that a stationary point of the problem is sought.
We tested two scenarios to analyze the profitability of the storage operator. In the
first test, we assume that there is no option for the producers to expand their generation
capacities. In this test, it can easily be seen from the parameters chosen above that without
storage, the price of electricity will be very high during the second time period as the
demand is high (a22 = 80). Thus, storage is an obvious option to help stabilize the price of
electricity. The results of this test are reported in Tables 4 and 5. We also consider various
values for the capacity of storage because the impact and the profits of the storage operator
vary with respect to its capacity σS . We report results for three values of the capacity of
storage: σS = 15, σS = 18 and σS = 30. The results show that storage is indeed used at
different levels for each of the values of σS . Looking at the resulting prices in Table 4, we
can see that for lower values of σS , the prices of electricity during the second time period
(pi21 and pi22) can be very high, reflecting the fact that (σ
S = 15) there are not enough
resources to meet the demand. However when the capacity of storage is enough to support
the generation and transmission (σS = 18, 30), the prices are lower. Conversely, the results
in Table 5 showing the profits of each player indicates that if the storage operator uses a
large storage capacity, it may not make any profit at all.
One question therefore is: what is an “optimal” storage capacity that should be selected
from both the player and the system perspective? In an attempt to answer this question, we
experimented with various values of the storage capacity σS ranging from 0 to 20 and the
results of the profits of Producers A, B and the storage operator are shown in the left hand
side of Figure 4. On the right-hand side of Figure 4 is the behavior of the prices at each node
during the second (on-peak) time period. Figure 4 shows that in the absence of sufficient
storage resources, the prices during the second time period are quite high, thus allowing
both producers to make high profits. However, when there is enough storage resources,
both these profits and the prices go down. The most interesting part of this analysis is the
profit made by the storage operator which has a concave shape, suggesting that there is a
storage capacity that maximizes the profit made by the storage operator. One can see in
Figure 4 that the value of the optimal storage capacity which provides the maximum profit
is 10. However, the corresponding price of electricity during the second time period is quite
1Producer A: 20MW , producer B: 40MW . Demand: 80− 0.1pi22, so would need a price of 200$/MWh
to meet the demand.
2The variables EAt , E
B
t , y
A
t , y
B
t are not reported here as they do not appear in the model solved for this
part of our experiments
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Table 4: Producer A and B cannot expand their generation capacities2
Var.
σS = 15 σS = 18 σS = 30
t=1 t =2 t=1 t=2 t=1 t=2
Producer A
sA 19.3 37.55 19.3 39.05 19.3 39.25
qA 23.5 60 26.5 60 26.9 60
fA 4.2 22.45 0.00 20.95 0 20.75
bA 0 NA 7.2 NA 7.6 NA
λAmax 0 17.5 0 2.5 0 0.5
λAmin 0 0 0 0 0 0
vA 1 1 1 1 1 1
ηA 0 0 0 0 0 0
δA 7 24.5 7 9.5 7 7.5
Producer B
sB 25 40 29.2 40 29.2 40
qB 40 40 40 40 40 40
bB 15 NA 10.8 NA 10.8 NA
λBmax 1 18.5 1 3.5 1 1.5
λBmin 0 0 0 0 0 0
vB 1 1 1 1 1 1
ηB 0 0 0 0 0 0
δB 8 25.5 8 10.5 8 8.5
TSO
g12 4.2 22.45 7.2 20.95 7.6 20.75
12 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sto. Ope.
hSt 15 NA 18 NA 18.4 NA
θSt 17 NA 2 NA 0 NA
Market
pit1 7 24.5 7 9.5 7 7.5
pit2 8 25.5 8 10.5 8 8.5
τ12 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
ωS 17.5 NA 2.5 NA 0.5 NA
Table 5: Profit of each player when Producer A and B cannot expand their generation
capacities
Prod. A Prod. B TSO Sto. Oper
σS = 15 1050 780 0 255
σS = 18 150 180 0 36
σS = 30 30 100 0 0
high. Therefore, if one is concerned about a capacity that stabilizes the price of electricity
during the high-demand time period, a better value of the storage capacity is σS = 18,
which guarantees profit for the storage operator and for which the prices are around 8.
We conducted a second set of experiments to analyze the profitability and the impact
of storage in the network if both Producers A and B have the possibility to expand their
generation capacities. Instead of paying for storage, the producers could decide to sim-
ply expand and generate the extra energy by themselves in order to meet the demand
(Dtn(pitn) = atn − btnpitn) at low price and possibly make more profits. For this set of
experiments, we considered the same parameters as above and experimented with different
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Figure 4: Profits and prices vs storage capacity
values for the unit costs of the expanded production units ρA and ρB . Thus, the unit cost
of generating electricity for each producer is 7, the unit cost of storage is 0.5 and the unit
cost of transporting electricity from node 1 to node 2 is 1. This means that, it would cost
Producer B at least 7.5 to generate and store electricity, and it would cost Producer A at
least 8 to sell electricity to node 2. Therefore we have investigated three possible value of
ρA and ρB , namely ρA = ρB = 7.4, ρA = ρB = 7.6 and ρA = ρB = 8.1. These three
values show us what will happen if expanding the generation capacities of the producers is
respectively:
• less expensive than using storage,
• more expensive than using storage but less than the cost endured by Producer A for
selling directly to node 2,
• more expensive than the above two points.
We present the results of this analysis in Tables 6 and 7. It can be seen in Table 6 that
storage is consistently needed to support the supply of electricity and to keep the prices
steady. One interesting thing to notice in Table 6 is that when ρA = ρB = 7.4, the new
generator of Producer B is being used to generate 5 units of electricity at time t = 1 while
the existing generator is not used to full capacity even though it is cheaper. This is simply
because of the minimum output requirement of the new generator. The results in Table
7 suggest that the storage operator never makes a profit. However, further experiments
shows that storage can be profitable if the appropriate storage capacity is chosen as also
shown by the previous analysis. To support this, we have analyzed the profits of each player
for different values of the storage capacity (σS) ranging from 0 to 20 when the costs of
expansion (ρA and ρB) are set to 8.1. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 8.
This table shows that for small values of σS ≤ 10 there is a profit for the storage operator.
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Table 6: Producers A and B can expand their generation capacity and σS = 30
Var.
ρA = ρB = 7.4 ρA = ρB = 7.6 ρA = ρB = 8.1
t=1 t =2 t=1 t=2 t=1 t=2
Producer A
sA 19.3 39.3 19.3 39.3 19.3 39.25
qA 19.3 39.3 19.3 39.3 26.9 60
fA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.6 20.75
bA 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A
EA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
vA 1 1 1 1 1 1
yA 0 0 0 0 0 0
δA 7 7 7 7 7 7.5
Producer B
sB 29.3 65 29.29 63.53 21.6 40
qB 38.55 40 40 40 40 40
bB 14.25 N/A 15.71 N/A 18.4 N/A
EB 5 25 5.0 23.53 0.00 0
vB 1 1 1 1 1 1
yB 1 1 1 1 0 0
δB 7 7.5 7.1 7.6 8 8.5
TSO
g12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.60 20.75
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sto. Ope.
hSt 14.25 N/A 15.71 N/A 18.4 N/A
θSt 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A
Market
pit1 7 7 7 7 7 7.5
pit2 7 7.5 7.1 7.6 8 8.5
τ12 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.5
ωS 0.5 N/A 0.5 N/A 0.5 N/A
That is because storage is indeed needed but not providing enough capacity and therefore
the price of using storage is high due to congestion. When the value of σS is between 11
and 16, there is no profit for the storage operator. However, we can note that the amount
of storage used is the same (10.76) for all these values. This suggests that the expanded
production units are needed to meet the demand, since the available storage capacity is not
able to fully support the transmission. Thus, when σS is around 18, it changes the dynamic
and the storage re-become profitable, simply because the producer are no longer using the
expensive (new) generators. This can also be seen in Table 6, when ρA = ρB = 8.1 the
amount of power stored is 18.4 and none of the producers are using the new generators.
Table 7: Profit of each player when Producer A and B can expand their generation capacities
Prod. A Prod. B TSO Sto. Oper
ρA = ρB = 7.4 0 20.50 0 0.00
ρA = ρB = 7.6 0 25.50 0 0.00
ρA = ρB = 8.1 30.00 100.00 0 0.00
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Table 8: Different storage capacities with their associated profits when ρA = ρB = 8.1
Profits
σS A B TSO Storage pi11 pi21 pi12 pi22 h
S
0 6 44 0 0 7 7.1 7 8.1 0
1 6 44 0 0.6 7 7.1 7 8.1 1
2 6 44 0 1.2 7 7.1 7 8.1 2
3 6 44 0 1.8 7 7.1 7 8.1 3
4 6 44 0 2.4 7 7.1 7 8.1 4
5 6 44 0 3 7 7.1 7 8.1 5
6 6 44 0 3.6 7 7.1 7 8.1 6
7 6 44 0 4.2 7 7.1 7 8.1 7
8 6 44 0 4.8 7 7.1 7 8.1 8
9 6 44 0 5.4 7 7.1 7 8.1 9
10 6 44 0 6 7 7.1 7 8.1 10
11 6 68 0 0 7 7.1 7.6 8.1 10.76
12 6 68 0 0 7 7.1 7.6 8.1 10.76
13 6 68 0 0 7 7.1 7.6 8.1 10.76
14 6 68 0 0 7 7.1 7.6 8.1 10.76
15 6 68 0 0 7 7.1 7.6 8.1 10.76
16 6 68 0 0 7 7.1 7.6 8.1 10.76
17 450 380 0 119 7 14.5 8 15.5 17
18 150 180 0 36 7 9.5 8 10.5 18
19 30 100 0 0 7 7.5 8 8.5 18.4
20 30 100 0 0 7 7.5 8 8.5 18.4
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a study of the equilibria in traffic network and power system
network with storage in the presence of logic constraints. These constraints are modeled as
binary variables which are added to standard complementarity-based equilibrium models.
For example in the traffic equilibrium, we showed how binary variables can be introduced
to model varying degrees of equity in the flow of traffic. While in power system networks
with storage, we used binary variables to model physically-based non-convexities such as
the minimum power outputs of production units.
With regards to the traffic equilibrium problem, we have observed that the equilibrium
solution provided by complementarity models alone may suggest that the flows along two or
more paths of the same OD pairs are largely disproportionate. We have therefore shown that
logic constraints can be added to these models to control the flows on different paths without
increasing the travel costs of the vehicles. Our computational results showed that the
addition of these logic constraints to traffic equilibrium models can achieve more equitable
equilibrium.
We also studied the equilibrium problem of power markets with the addition of a storage
operator. We have analyzed some benefits of including a storage operator in a power system
network with the role of storing electricity during the off-peak demand periods and releases
it during the peak demand periods to be sold by the producers. Our analyses showed that
the presence of a storage operator in the market is beneficial in terms of stabilizing the price
of electricity during on-peak demand periods and in terms of supporting the transmission
in meeting the demand satisfaction at all time. The analysis also suggests that it can be
profitable for a storage investor to operate as a service provider. However, it is important
to point out that the example for the power network application is purely illustrative as it
consists of only two nodes, two time periods, one storage unit, two producers, and a linear
representation of the network. A more realistic example would not only be larger but also
account for power losses as well as the levels of charge and discharge of storage during each
time period. Nevertheless the positive results reported in this paper are motivation for
carrying out a more detailed study.
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